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Author: Jason Harrow

Dan Ortiz of the University of Virginia Law School has these thoughts on the decision: Wednesday’s opinions in LULAC confounded, I think, nearly all expectation. While many thought that the Court might develop the law governing partisan gerrymandering in one direction or another, it did not. As exactly before, such claims are justiciable but the Court can’t find any law to govern them. On the other hand, few expected the Court to make any major changes in doctrine under the Voting Rights Act and Shaw v. Reno. But LULAC surely did. What follows are short descriptions of four moves I see the Court making in these two areas, some of which could have large consequences. Whether they do or not depends on how seriously courts, including the Supreme Court, take them in the future. That’s unclear. I apologize for the doctrinal nerdiness of the discussion. Unlike the Court’s handling of the gerrymandering claims, most of these four moves are fairly technical and difficult to understand. But they are no less potentially significant for that. Three of the Court’s moves spring from its analysis of whether Texas District 23 violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In order to boost a Republican incumbent’s chances of reelection in a district that was becoming increasingly Latino, Texas had replaced some of District 23’s Latino voters with Anglo voters who would more likely vote Republican. The Court found that the plaintiffs had met § 2’s three threshold factors—they had shown that Latinos in the area were “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” that they were “politically cohesive,” and that the Angelo majority votes “sufficiently as a bloc to enable it … usually to defeat” Latino-preferred candidates. This part of the analysis is unremarkable and makes no real changes to existing § 2 law.

Rick Pildes of NYU Law School has these thoughts on today’s decision: Today's complex opinion in the Texas case is noteworthy for a number of reasons, some more obvious, some more subtle. As a practical matter, Democrats lost the war but won a battle that might have important partisan implications nonetheless. As a legal matter, apart from its significance for current law in the areas of race, politics, and the Constitution, the decision will also have direct implications for current debates in Congress over whether to renew the Voting Rights Act and if so, in what form, both to address possible constitutional challenges to the Act and to deal with the diversity within new minority communities, such as the Latino community, that the Court wrestles with in this case. 1. Partisan Gerrymandering. This aspect of the case will get the most attention, since it is both the easiest to understand and has the dramatic personality of Tom DeLay at the center. The Court held that the hardball tactics Texas Republicans used to redraw districts to increase Republican power in the US House may have been tough politics, but not in such a way that the Constitution was violated. As between the aggressive Democratic gerrymander of Texas in the 1990s and the Tom DeLay inspired gerrymander of today, the Court majority essentially washed its hands of the matter and concluded there was no constitutional basis for choosing sides in this ugly partisan warfare. The question now will be whether this ruling triggers a similar spiral of other mid-decade redistrictings after this fall's House elections, the answer to which might depend on how close the balance of power turns out to be in the House — and whether Democrats in states like La, New Mexico and some other states are willing to use the same hardball tactics as DeLay prompted in Texas. Looking forward on this issue, might partisan gerrymandering violate the Constitution in other contexts? Technically, the answer remains yes, as it has for many years now. Practically, though, the opinion makes it less likely the Court will find an actual violation. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito once again signalled their unwillingness to confront precedents they did not have to address; showing a cautious moderation, both refused to take positions on the large question of whether partisan gerrymandering is ever unconstitutional. But Justice Kennedy rejected yet another effort to craft such a standard. Because Justice Kennedy has been more open to the possibility of such a standard, his rejection of every actual standard offered to him, including the one today, makes it harder for plaintiffs to win on partisan gerrymandering claims.

Rick Hasen of Loyola Law School has these thoughts (cross-posted on his Election Law Blog) on today’s decision: Initial Thoughts on the Texas Redistricting Case [cross-posted at Election Law Blog] The Supreme Court's decision today in LULAC v. Perry is a rich and complex set of six opinions, and there is a huge amount of material, especially on interpretation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, that will require more sustained study for me to understand. So take these comments in the tentative spirit in which they are made. From my initial review, here are the headlines as I see them. 1. Partisan gerrymandering claims remain losers, at least for now. I am reminded of the old "Saturday Night Live" routine with "Weekend Update" anchor Chevy Chase reporting: "This just in. Generalissimo Francisco Franco is still dead." For the Democrats in the this case, and for plaintiffs for the foreseeable future, courts will accept partisan gerrymandering claims (because there is no majority holding them non-justiciable) and then reject the claims because there is no manageable standard. There is no majority still for either rejecting such claims outright, or for accepting them and providing a test for separating permissible and non-permissible consideration of party. Justice Kennedy remains undecided.