Author: Eliza Presson

Erica Goldberg discusses the Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza (07-581).  Additional information on the case is available on SCOTUSwiki, here. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion held that nothing in either the National Labor Relations Act, which controls collective bargaining agreements made on behalf of union members, or the ADEA forbids unions from mandating arbitration to resolve statutory discrimination claims.  The majority touted the importance of allowing parties to bargain contractually for exchanges of rights and responsibilities, and it noted that courts should generally not interfere in this process.  According to the majority, “[t]he decision to fashion a [collective bargaining agreement] to require arbitration of employment-discrimination claims is no different from the many other decisions made by parties in designing grievance machinery.” Justice Thomas then confronted the thorny relevant precedent.  Over three decades ago in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Court held that unions cannot contractually waive an individual employee’s substantive guarantees against workplace discrimination.  More recently, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court held that individual employees who waive their right to a federal forum on their own behalf may be compelled to arbitrate employment discrimination claims.  As a result of these two rulings, the Second Circuit below in 14 Penn Plaza ruled that, while individuals may waive the right to a judicial forum for federal discrimination claims, the same provision in a collective bargaining agreement was unenforceable.

Stanford student Patrick Nemeroff discusses the Court's decision in No. 07-1372. Additional information is available on SCOTUSwiki, here.

On Tuesday, March 31st, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, reversing the Hawaii Supreme Court’s holding that the federally enacted Apology Resolution bars the State of Hawaii from selling to third parties any land held in public trust until the claims of native Hawaiians to the lands have been resolved. The Court first held that it has jurisdiction to review the Hawaii Supreme Court’s opinion because it rested on the Apology Resolution. It then found the Hawaii Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Apology Resolution to be erroneous, and held that federal law does not bar the State from selling land held in public trust. Accordingly, it remanded the case for the Hawaii Supreme Court to determine if Hawaiian law alone supports the same outcome.

Stanford student Beverly Moore previews Polar Tankers v. City of Valdez, which is to be heard tomorrow morning at 10am. Additional information and filings are available from SCOTUSwiki, here. Please note that the Stanford clinic wrote the cert. stage brief in opposition. The Tonnage Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, Cl.3, prohibits states or municipalities from “laying a duty of tonnage,” which is defined as a fee imposed “upon a vessel, according to its tonnage, as an instrument of commerce, for entering or leaving a port, or navigating the public waters of the country.” On April 1, in No. 08-310, Polar Tankers v. City of Valdez, Alaska, the Court will consider (1) whether the Tonnage Clause prohibits a municipal personal property tax that falls on large vessels using the municipality’s harbor, and (2) whether a municipal personal property tax assessed on property with an out-of-state domicile violates the Commerce and Due Process Clauses when the assessment includes time spent by the property on the high seas or otherwise outside any State’s taxing jurisdiction. This case stems from a tax enacted by Valdez, Alaska, which is located on Prince William Sound at the south end of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Each year, oil tankers load hundreds of millions of barrels of crude oil at the City’s port. In 1999, the City extended its property tax to apply to “boats and vessels of at least 95 feet in length” that are neither used “primarily in some aspect of commercial fishing” nor “dock at privately owned docks in the City.” The tax is calculated by multiplying a vessel’s total assessed value by a ratio that is in turn determined by dividing the number of days spent in Port Valdez by the total number of days it spends in all ports with taxing authority. The City resolution approving the tax also allows a taxpayer to petition for a different apportionment method if the default method “does not reasonably represent the portion of the total value of the vessel that should be” attributed to the City.

Stanford student Samantha Bateman discusses oral argument in Yeager v. US. At Monday’s oral argument in Yeager v. United States, the Supreme Court wrestled with how to make sense of what went on behind closed doors in a jury deliberation that produced several acquittals but also deadlocked on other factually related counts. Samuel Buffone, arguing for petitioner F. Scott Yeager, began by advocating for what he called a “straightforward application” of the Court’s collateral estoppel analysis in Ashe v. Swenson: namely, that when a jury acquittal necessarily decides an issue in a defendant’s favor, that determination is final, and the government may not seek to retry that issue before a second jury. The fact that the jury deadlocked on other counts in the same case should not change the analysis, he emphasized, because unlike acquittals, hung counts are not final verdicts. Indeed, “[t]hey decide nothing.” The question presented in the case was whether collateral estoppel bars retrial of defendants in mixed-verdict situations like Yeager’s generally, but Justice Souter pressed Mr. Buffone almost immediately on the factual question of whether the acquittal in Yeager’s case specifically should operate to preclude further prosecution. Justice Souter questioned whether the acquittals in this case “necessarily established” that Yeager did not have insider information. Was it possible instead, he wondered, that the jury simply acquitted on the securities fraud counts because it agreed that Yeager had not himself made misleading statements and had no duty to correct misleading statements made by others, while failing to agree on whether Yeager actually had insider information? Mr. Buffone responded that the totality of the record suggested that that was not the case because the prosecution’s integrated theory at trial was an omissions theory, predicated on the argument that Yeager had a duty to disclose what he knew.

Stanford student Samantha Bateman previews next Monday's argument in Yeager v. US (08-67). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a prior court’s decision on an issue necessary to its judgment can preclude relitigation of that same issue in a future case. The Supreme Court held in Ashe v. Swenson (1970) that criminal defendants may invoke that doctrine as part of the protections accorded to them by the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. On Monday, March 23, 2009, in Yeager v. United States, No. 08-67, the Court will consider whether collateral estoppel bars retrial of a defendant who was acquitted by a jury on some counts when that same jury failed to reach a verdict on other, factually related, counts in the indictment. This case stems from one of several criminal prosecutions of white-collar executives in the wake of the Enron scandal. Petitioner F. Scott Yeager, an executive at Enron Broadband Services (“EBS”), an Enron telecommunications unit, was charged with wire fraud, securities fraud, insider trading, money laundering, and conspiracy to engage in securities fraud and wire fraud. The indictment alleged that Yeager participated in a conspiracy to deceive the public and drive up the price of Enron stock, and that he sold large amounts of Enron shares based on insider knowledge. At trial, the government’s theory was that Yeager and other executives defrauded Enron investors and shareholders by purposely making misrepresentations and material omissions about EBS’s revenues, business performance, and technological capabilities. Yeager relied upon a good-faith defense, arguing that he was not responsible for any false statements or material omissions and that indeed he could not have participated in any scheme to defraud investors because he had a good-faith, reasonable belief in EBS’s financial stability and promising future.

Stanford Law School student Josh Friedman previews the March 25 argument in US v. Denedo (08-267).  Additional information and filings are available on SCOTUSwiki, here. Does the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have jurisdiction to reverse a former service member’s court-martial when the convicted individual learns, seven years later, that his lawyer was afflicted by severe alcoholism? On Wednesday, March 28th, 2009, the Supreme Court will hear argument on this question in case No. 08-267, United States v. Denedo. Jacob Denedo hopes the Court will agree with the court below and affirm that the answer is yes. Born in Nigeria, Mr. Denedo came to the United States in 1984. In 1989, he enlisted in the U.S. Navy, becoming a lawful permanent resident one year later. In 1998, the Navy brought criminal charges against him in connection with the alleged defrauding of a community college. With the assistance of both civilian and military counsel, Mr. Denedo pleaded guilty in exchange for a reduction in the charges and the opportunity to be tried in a special court-martial that could not impose a sentence greater than six months. He was sentenced to (among other penalties) three months’ confinement, and received a bad-conduct discharge by the court-martial that resulted in his departure from the Navy in May 2000. On October 30, 2006, the government initiated deportation proceedings, citing the court-martial conviction as justification. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Denedo filed a petition for extraordinary relief (also known as a writ of error coram nobis) in the Navy-Marine-Corps Court of Military Appeals (N-MCCA), seeking collateral review of his court-martial on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he alleged that although he had explicitly asked his attorneys about the possibility of deportation, he had never been informed that he could be deported as a result of his plea. He presented evidence in support of his ineffective assistance allegation—including evidence that his lead counsel suffered from alcoholism—but his petition was denied.

Stanford student John Dalton discusses last week's oral argument in No. 08-5274, Dean v. US. Arguing for petitioner, Scott Forster began by contending that – based on the text and legislative history of the statute – Section 924(c) must contain an intent requirement. As has been a recent trend, the Court began delving into the depths of grammar. Chief Justice Roberts began an exchange with what he believed to be the strongest point for the other side, that the language of the statute was in passive voice (i.e., the firearm is discharged) rather than active (i.e., the defendant discharged the firearm). Mr. Forster responded that even the passive tense has some object and thus, the mens rea requirements that the Court has created are still applicable. After some back and forth on this point, Justice Ginsburg posited that under the Government’s reading, the statute would allow the defendant to be charged with extra time if the security guard in the bank were to apprehend him, take away the gun, and then the gun discharged while under the security guard’s control. Justice Scalia then pushed the hypothetical further and asked whether, under the Government’s view, the defendant could be deemed to have “brandished” the gun if the security guard grabbed the gun and waved it around. Justice Souter then noted that the brandish provision of the statute required a purpose to intimidate, which leads to a larger problem because the definition of brandish shows that Congress knows how to create a specific intent element if it chooses. Mr. Forster responded by arguing that Congress must affirmatively remove a mens rea element; in his view, Congress’s inclusion of a specific definition of brandish does not mean that Congress intended to make the discharge provision strict liability. Justice Souter was unmoved by this argument, claimed that it would not be improper at all, and noted other case law in which the presumption against mens rea does not apply – such as vehicular manslaughter, in which the rationale for the lack of a mens rea requirement is that the person acts in a way that creates risk. Mr. Forster attempted to answer the question by saying that the statute was focused on the conduct of an individual, rather than the issue of punishing negligence.

Stanford student David Schwartz discusses Monday's decision in No. 105, Original. In oral argument, Justice Alito asked the Kansas Attorney General a tough question that the Attorney General could not, to the Court’s satisfaction, answer: does the Court have the discretion in its original jurisdiction to...